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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Scott Douglas Allred pled guilty to a single count 
of felony DUI. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. The 
district court retained jurisdiction after which Mr. Allred was placed on probation. After a 
second probation violation, the district court revoked Mr. Allred's probation and 
Mr. Allred began serving his sentence in the penitentiary. On appeal, he contends that 
the district court erred in revoking his probation and in failing to further reduce his 
sentence. Further, Mr. Allred contends that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of 
the June 10, 2009, jurisdictional review hearing. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
At approximately eight o'clock in the evening on October 17, 2008, a Boise police 
officer pulled over a 1998 Pontiac Sunfire for having a taillight out. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.117.) The officer pulled over the vehicle and 
made contact with the driver, who was identified as Scott D. Allred. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Allred admitted to consuming alcohol earlier that evening and had a blood alcohol 
concentration of greater than .08. (PSI, pp.2, 60; R., p.23.) Mr. Allred was charged by 
information with felony DUI and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R., pp.22-23.) 
On November 13, 2008, Mr. Allred pled guilty to one count of felony DUI, and, in 
exchange, the State dismissed the misdemeanor, driving without privileges charge. 
(11/13/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24; R., pp.24-25.) Initially, there was a proposed plea 
agreement in which the State agreed to limit its sentencing recommendations to two 
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years fixed, plus eight years indeterminate, and recommend that the sentence be 
suspended and Mr. Allred placed on probation. (11/13/08 Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, LA.) 
However the State's offer was contingent on Mr. Allred only having three prior 
misdemeanor DUls. (11/13/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Allred, prior to pleading guilty to 
the charge, advised the court that he had additional prior DUI charges. 1 (11/13/08 
Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14, L.14.) Thus Mr. Allred acknowledged that the State was no 
longer obligated to follow the plea agreement. (11/13/08 Tr., p.15, L.i8 - p.16, L.6.) 
Further, due to the fact that Mr. Allred had a significant mental health history, the 
defense requested that Mr. Allred be considered for entry into the mental health court. 
(11/13/08 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-20.) 
The district court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation, a 
substance abuse evaluation and a mental health evaluation. (11/13/08 Tr., p.28, LS.5-
11; R., p.25.) Mr. Allred was sentenced by the district court on January 8, 2009. (See 
generally 1/8/09 Tr.) Although Mr. Allred made an eloquent allocution, the district court 
nevertheless sentenced Mr. Allred to ten years, with four years fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction. (1/8/09 Tr., p.18, Ls.18-23; R., pp.30-32.) At sentencing, the district court 
advised defense counsel that it would be open to placing Mr. Allred in mental health 
court at the rider review hearing. 2 (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Allred was 
1 Although the district court offered to set a new hearing date for Mr. Allred's guilty plea 
in light of the additional prior DUls, Mr. Allred chose to plead guilty that day, after being 
advised that the State would likely withdraw its plea offer. (11/13/08 Tr., p.15, LA -
~.16, L.23.) 
"THE COURT: So I want to advise you to put in your notes that this determination is 
without prejudice for the defense to request that this court consider referral of the 
defendant to the Mental Health Court after completion of the Rider because it may be 
very beneficial to the defendant in maintaining." (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.) 
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successful on his rider and on June 10, 2009, the district court placed him on probation 
for six years.3 (R., pp.37, 39-45; 2/2/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.21-22.) 
After nearly two full years on probation, a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation 
Violation was filed on March 24, 2011. (R., ppA7-49; PSI, p.2.) Mr. Allred admitted that 
he violated the conditions of his probation by: (1) consuming alcohol; (2) frequenting an 
establishment where alcohol is the main source of income; (3) moving without 
permission; and (4) failing to pay fines. (R., pp.62; PSI, p.2; 2/2/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25.) 
After Mr. Allred admitted that he violated the terms of his probation, the district 
court ordered an updated PSI, a substance abuse evaluation, and a mental health 
evaluation. (12/8/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) At disposition, the district court revoked 
Mr. Allred's probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.64-66; 2/2/12 
Tr., p.25, LsA-6) In so doing, the district court, acting sua sponte under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35, reduced Mr. Allred's fixed time from four years to three and a half years, and 
extended the indeterminate portion of Mr. Allred's sentence from six years to six and a 
half years. (R., p.65; 2/2/12 Tr., p.25, LsA-11.) The district court gave Mr. Allred credit 
for 317 days served. (R., p.65; 2/2/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-12, p.26, Ls.19-21.) Mr. Allred 
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order of Revocation of Probation 
and Reducing Sentence and Commitment. (R., pp.88-90.) 
On appeal, Mr. Allred filed a motion to augment and suspend the briefing 
schedule, wherein he requested that the record on appeal be augmented with the 
3 The record on appeal is not clear as to whether a request for mental health court was 
discussed at the rider review hearing. (R., pp.36-37.) Counsel for the appellant 
requested that the record on appeal be augmented to include a transcript of the rider 
review hearing; however, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the requested transcript as 
discussed herein. Based on the PSI, it appears that Mr. Allred should have been 
assessed for mental health court before being placed on probation due to his severe 
mental health issues. (See generally, PSI.) 
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transcript of the rider review hearing on June 10, 2009. (Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion 
to Augment), pp.1-2.) The State objected to Mr. Allred's requests for the transcript, 
claiming that Mr. Allred failed to demonstrate that the transcript was relevant. 
(Objection to Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement 
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, 
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying Mr. Allred's motion. (Order Denying 
Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p.1.) 
Mr. Allred then moved the Idaho Supreme Court to reconsider its order denying 
his motion to augment the record, arguing that denying Mr. Allred access to the 
transcript violated his due process and equal protection rights. (Motion to Reconsider 
Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (Motion to 
Reconsider), pp.1-7.) In his Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Allred identified the relevancy of 
the requested transcript-the fact that previously, a discussion was held on the record 
in which the district court advised defense counsel that it would consider a request to 
get Mr. Allred into mental health court as Mr. Allred's mental health issues might 
otherwise inhibit his ability to be successful on probation.4 (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.) 
The State objected to Mr. Allred's Motion to Reconsider, stating as its basis that "Allred 
has still failed to demonstrate that the requested transcript is relevant to the resolution 
of any issue over which the appellate court has jurisdiction." (Objection to Motion to 
Reconsider Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
4 The district court thereby was aware of the potential for Mr. Allred to have difficulty 
meeting the terms of probation without additional assistance in managing his mental 
illness. These circumstances should have been further considered by the district court 
when the court revoked Mr. Allred's probation on February 2, 2012. 
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Schedule, p.1.) The Court denied Mr. Allred's Motion to Reconsider on October 31, 
2012. (Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order, pp.1-2.) 
Mr. Allred contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to place him back on probation and by failing to further reduce his sentence, sua 
sponte. Mr. Allred further argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process 
and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of the June 




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Allred's probation 
and executed his underlying sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, and by 
not further reducing Mr. Allred's sentence upon revoking his probation? 
2. Was Mr. Allred denied due process and equal protection when the Idaho 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Allred's Probation And 
Executed His Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Allred asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and executed his original sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, only 
reducing the sentence, sua sponte, to three and one-half years fixed, and six and one-
half years indeterminate. He asserts that the violations did not justify revoking 
probation, especially in light of the goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection 
of society could be best served by his continued supervision under the probation 
department. However, even if Mr. Allred's violations justified revoking his probation, the 
district court abused its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Allred's Probation 
And Executed His Sentence 
In light of the significant progress Mr. Allred made while on probation, his 
probation violations did not justify revoking probation. In a probation revocation 
proceeding, the district court addresses three issues: First, was a condition of probation 
violated? Second, does the violation justify revocation? Finally, if probation is revoked, 
what prison sentence should be imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 
(Ct. App. 2001). As to the first issue before the district court, Mr. Allred concedes that 
he violated conditions of his probation as he admitted he had done so. (12/8/11 Tr., p.8, 
L.24 - p.10, L.1.) Mr. Allred took full responsibility for violating the terms of his 
probation. (2/2/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.20-21.) 
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When a defendant violates any of the terms of probation, the decision to revoke 
probation rests within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Jones, 123 
Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993). Mr. Allred asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in finding that his probation violations justified revocation. The district court 
must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether 
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Phillips, 113 Idaho 176, 
177 (Ct. App. 1987). Mr. Allred asserts that his continued probation would achieve the 
goals of his rehabilitation and the protection of society. 
Although Mr. Allred's violations were serious, they did not justify revoking his 
probation. Mr. Allred admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by drinking 
alcohol at a bar and not paying his fines as required. (12/8/11 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.1 0, L.1.) 
Mr. Allred also admitted that he did not obtain his probation officer's written permission 
prior to moving out of his residence. (12/8/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.15-21.) However, Mr. Allred 
enjoyed great successes while on probation. He began rebuilding his relationship with 
his son, Taylor, and he stayed sober for a substantial period of time while on probation. 
(2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; PSI, p.14.) In fact, Mr. Allred was clean and sober for 
almost two years, from October 2008 to August 2010, prior to having his probation 
revoked. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; R., pA8.) Mr. Allred's intentions are good, and it 
should be noted that the road to recovery is not an easy one; Mr. Allred was clean for 
almost two years but relapsed. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) While on probation 
Mr. Allred put forth an immense effort to stop drinking, but, after 21-22 months of 
sobriety, Mr. Allred relapsed - as is not entirely uncommon for someone who is an 
alcoholic. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) While on probation, Mr. Allred made great 
strides to live a healthy, non-criminal life. Mr. Allred moved in with his 19 year old son, 
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and did not commit any new crimes. (2/2/12 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.3; R., pp.47 -49.) 
He noted that he actually felt like he was living a "normal" life for the first time in over ten 
years. (PSI, p.9.) 
Assuming arguendo the district court was justified in revoking Mr. Allred's 
probation, it should have further reduced his sentence. The third question to be 
answered in a probation revocation proceeding, is what prison sentence should be 
imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). In answering this third 
question, the appellate courts examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. 
Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Allred does not allege that his sentence 
exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, 
Mr. Allred must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. 
Mr. Allred has not had an easy life. Mr. Allred had back-to-back DUls at the age 
of 19, after his father died. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Allred has been chronically homeless since 
2004. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Allred struggles to provide for himself and has had an especially 
difficult time in the last several years. (PSI, p.34.) On the evening that he received the 
underlying DUI charge in this case, Mr. Allred was living in his car after recently being 
discharged from State Hospital South. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Allred planned to drive his car 
six blocks to an alley he had previously been parking in to sleep for the night. (PSI, 
p.61.) Mr. Allred, prior to his incarceration for the probation violation, had been living in 
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transitional housing, living with friends, or living in his car. (PSI, p.34.) Just before 
being arrested on the most recent probation violation, Mr. Allred had been living with his 
son for nine months-his first real home since 2004. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Allred was 
enjoying finally having a home and also had a cat. (PSI, p.34.) Notably, the mental 
health evaluator described Mr. Allred as "quite organized and intelligent and quite 
philosophicaL" (PSI, p.35.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when it imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on 
Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,414 (1981). The majority of 
Mr. Allred's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, p.34.) 
Mr. Allred has been using alcohol since he was fourteen years old. (PSI, pp.21, 33.) 
When his mental health medication is not working and he is depressed, Mr. Allred tends 
to "self-medicate" with alcohol. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Allred recognizes that he has a pattern 
of using alcohol to cope when he receives bad news such as the death of a family 
member or loss of a job opportunity. (1/8/09 Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.22.) 
Another aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the 
fact that Mr. Allred has strong support from his friends and family. See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
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support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Allred's best friend 
for many years, Tracy Smith, is very supportive of him and wrote a letter to the court on 
Mr. Allred's behalf. (PSI, pp.7, 14.) Ms. Smith describes Mr. Allred as a "devoted and 
wonderful father" who is rebuilding his relationships with his children. (PSI, p.14.) 
Mr. Allred's 19 year old son, Taylor, was present at Mr. Allred's probation violation 
disposition to show his support of his father. (2/2/12 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.10.) All 
three of Mr. Allred's children wrote letters to the court on his behalf. (PSI, pp.67, 99-
101.) Further, Mr. Allred moved out of the River of Life shelter in order to live with his 
son with whom he was in the process of reuniting. (PSI, p.14.) One of Mr. Allred's 
goals is "[t]o be the best father I can be to the greatest children anyone could hope for." 
(PSI, p.71.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. 
HoI/on v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Allred's mental illnesses substantially 
contributed to his current situation. Mr. Allred suffers from PTSD, bipolar disorder, type 
II, narcissistic personality tendencies, severe depression, and has a history offour prior 
psychiatric hospitalizations.5 (12/8/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-20; PSI, pp.33, 36.) Mr. Allred has 
a long history of chronic depression.6 (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Allred recognizes that he self-
medicates with alcohol. (2/2/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.23-24.) Mr. Allred believes that he 
resumes drinking after disappointing or traumatic life events such as the death of his 
father. (PSI, p.33.) He knows that his mental health and incidents of alcohol abuse are 
5 Mr. Allred's most recent hospitalization at State Hospital South was from December 
2007 to April 14, 2008. (PSI, p.33.) Mr. Allred was hospitalized after being placed on a 
police hold for being intoxicated and suicidal in November 2007. (PSI, p.33.) 
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linked together, i.e., Mr. Allred uses alcohol to excess in an attempt to cope with 
stressful situations. (1/8/09, p.1?, Ls.20-22.) To handle periods of high emotional 
stress, Mr. Allred drinks alcohol, which in turn exacerbates his depression. (PSI, pp.33, 
70.) For example, Mr. Allred recently trained to be certified as a peer specialist in the 
mental health field, but found out, after spending a considerable amount of time of 
working on the certificate, that his felony conviction would preclude him from 
certification. (PSI, pp.10, 33.) Upon learning this disappointing news, Mr. Allred drank 
alcohol as a coping mechanism. (PSI, p.33.) Tellingly, Mr. Allred's most recent relapse 
coincided with him ceasing to take the medications prescribed to him in order to 
manage his mental health problems. (PSI, p.8.) 
Mr. Allred was in the Marine Corps for four years. (2/2/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.) 
The Nice court found the defendant's honorable discharge from the military to be a 
factor in mitigation of sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,90 (1982). In Mr. Allred's 
case, he was a Marine for four years, but was discharged when he was caught with 
drug paraphernalia. (2/2/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-22; PSI, p.34.) 
Further, Mr. Allred has shown remorse for his conduct and taken full 
responsibility for violating the terms of his probation. (2/2/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-19, p.20, 
LS.20-21, p.22, Ls.7-10.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a 
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct. State v. A/betts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
One Idaho case which addressed the issue of reducing a sentence where a 
defendant recognizes that he has a problem and expresses remorse was State v. 
6 Mr. Allred reported that his depressive symptoms can last up to two months and 
include: increased anxiety, difficulty sleeping, hopelessness, feelings of helplessness 
as well as suicidal ideation. (PSI, p.35.) 
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Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991). In Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted 
that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his 
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other 
positive attributes of his character." Id. at 209. Mr. Allred admitted that he is an 
alcoholic. (1/8/09 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-12.) However, Mr. Allred was successful on 
probation for almost two years and demonstrated that he can lead a sober life. (2/2/12 
Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Allred is committed to changing. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, L.17.) At 
sentencing, Mr. Allred adamantly told the court that he would never again drive under 
the influence? (2/2/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-15.) Further, Mr. Allred wrote that he should 
have sought help from probation and parole instead of using alcohol and noted that, "I 
ruined my life again by violating my probation. I could not feel worse as my decision 
affected not only me, but my son." (PSI, p.3.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment 
because the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's 
recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent 
outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling 
that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly 
weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Id. at 594-95. 
Therefore, the court reduced Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to 
exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. 
7 "But for your edification, Mr. Prosecutor, I touched that stove of driving under the 
influence nine times, and I will never touch it again. That will never happen again." 
(2/2/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-1S.) 
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Like Shideler, Mr. Allred has mental health problems, but also exhibited considerable 
remorse for his actions and truly desires to change his life. 
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Allred's significant rehabilitative potential, the district court 
abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Allred's probation. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Further Reduce 
Mr. Allred's Sentence Upon Revoking His Probation 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Allred's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte 
pursuant to Rule 35. When the district court decides to resume the execution of a 
previously suspended sentence, as it does when it revokes probation, it also has the 
authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 
145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). 
After a probation violation has been established, the district court may order the 
suspended sentence to be executed, but the court is also authorized under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 
(Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are 
the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. 
Thus the district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing 
objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the record. See id. Therefore, for all the 
reasons discussed in Section (B), supra, the district court abused its discretion by not 
reducing Mr. Allred's sentence sua sponte, even if only in recognition of his successful 
efforts on probation to that point. 
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II. 
Mr. Allred Was Denied Due Process And Equal Protection When The Idaho 
Supreme Court Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With A Necessary 
Transcript 
A. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent defendant 
access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues the defendant 
intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally deny an indigent 
defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is 
irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Allred filed two requests to augment the record with a transcript 
of Mr. Allred's rider review hearing held on June 10, 2009. The State twice objected 
and this Court twice denied Mr. Allred's motions. On appeal, Mr. Allred is challenging 
the Idaho Supreme Court's denials of his request for the transcript of the rider review 
hearing held on June 10, 2009. Mr. Allred asserts that the requested transcript is 
relevant to the issues addressed at the probation revocation hearing because 
Mr. Allred's performance on probation was directly and negatively affected by his mental 
health issues. (See PSI, pp.8, 10, 33-35,61, 70; 1/8/09 Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22; 2/2/12 
Tr., p.21, Ls.23-24.) 
At Mr. Allred's sentencing on January 8, 2009, the district court advised defense 
counsel that it would be open to placing Mr. Allred in mental health court at the rider 
review hearing. (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.) The court stated that it believed that 
mental health court would be beneficial to Mr. Allred to help him by "maintaining," by 
which the court presumably meant that mental health court would be beneficial to 
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Mr. Allred by helping him either maintain his sobriety or maintain his mental health while 
on probation. The record has not been established as to whether that request was 
restated at the rider review hearing or whether Mr. Allred's mental health was discussed 
at that time. As the district court had evidence before it relating to the connection 
between Mr. Allred's mental health and alcohol use when it dispositioned Mr. Allred, 
information or discussions relating to Mr. Allred's mental health are relevant to the 
circumstances surrounding the court's decision not to reinstate Mr. Allred on probation 
or further reduce his sentence due to his severe mental illness. Therefore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Mr. Allred due process and equal protection by denying his 
request for the June 10, 2009 transcript. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Court exercises free review in determining whether the constitutional 
requirements of due process have been satisfied. State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296 
(Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Allred Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcript 
The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. 
I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
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State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal. See I.C. § 19-2801. 
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court 
rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of 
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, 
"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be 
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appel/ate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. See Griffin v. Illinois 351 
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that in order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due 
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record 
which facilitates an effective merits-related appel/ate review); see also Burns v. Ohio, 
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360 U.S. 252 (1959) ("[o]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal 
cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty."). However, the second theme limits the states' obligation-
the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all 
of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. See State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 
487 (1963) ("[p]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be 
germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its 
funds unnecessarily in such circumstances."); see also Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971) (holding that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that 
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal, then it becomes the State's 
burden to prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal). 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
Here, the requested item falls within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. 
The transcript of the rider review hearing is relevant because Idaho appellate courts 
review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court 
appropriately revoked probation. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 
2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
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imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation 
of probation.") (emphasis added).8 
As set forth in appellant's Motion to Reconsider, appellate counsel for Mr. Allred 
requested an additional item necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal. The 
substance of the June 10, 2009, rider review hearing is not known to appellate counsel, 
as the minutes provided in the record do not indicate whether Mr. Allred's admission 
into mental health court was discussed. (R., pp.36-37.) However, the district court, 
prior to sentencing Mr. Allred to a rider on January 8, 2009, recognized that Mr. Allred 
had significant mental health issues, and advised Mr. Allred's counsel that he could ask 
the court to "consider referral of the defendant to the Mental Health Court after 
completion of the Rider because it may be very beneficial to the defendant in 
maintaining [his sobriety]." (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls. 11-17.) However, the minutes of the 
June 10, 2009 rider review hearing are not clear as to whether defense counsel 
requested a referral for Mr. Allred to mental health court, whether the court or Mr. Allred 
himself raised the issue of mental health court, or whether any discussion was had at a/l 
regarding Mr. Allred's mental health. (R., pp.36-37.) 
According to the minutes of the June 10, 2009, hearing, Mr. Allred addressed the 
court; the statement he made may have had some impact on the district court's decision 
to revoke probation in 2012, which is also an issue on appeal. (R., pp.36-37.) 
8But see State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 pA, (Ct. App. 2012) (not 
yet final) (holding that not "aI/ proceedings in the trial court up to and including 
sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial 
court's decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are 
properly made part of the record on appeal."). However, in Mr. Allred's case, as 
required by Morgan, "new evidence [wa]s presented in support of a renewed motion" as 
appellant filed a motion to reconsider with additional evidence as to the importance and 
relevance of the transcript. Id. at p.3. 
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Mr. Allred had a history of non-compliance with his mental health medications, after 
which he would typically relapse into using alcohol as a means to "self-medicate" his 
severe depression. (See PSI, p.8.) As Mr. Allred had stopped taking his mental health 
medications at the time of his probation violations (PSI, p.8), any statements he made to 
the district court regarding his mental health would be relevant to the district court's 
decision to revoke Mr. Allred's probation. Without access to the transcript of the 
June 10, 2009, evidentiary hearing Mr. Allred is unable to address on appeal whether 
the district court erred in not further considering Mr. Allred's mental health when it 
revoked his probation. 
In sum, the decision to deny Mr. Allred's request for the transcript will render his 
appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports the 
district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of 
Mr. Allred's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Allred should 
either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption should not be 
applied. 
D. By Failing To Provide Mr. Allred With Access To The Requested Transcript, The 
Court Has Denied Him The Opportunity To Receive Effective Assistance Of 
Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme 
Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due 
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
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In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, if counsel is to be effective, 
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in 
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967), held that the constitutional requirements of sUbstantial equality and fair process 
"can only be attained where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client .. 
. . [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he support his client's interest's to the best 
of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this 
case, the lack of access to the requested transcripts has prevented appellate counsel 
from making a conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented 
appellate counsel from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise, or 
whether there is factual support either in favor of any argument made or undercutting an 
argument. Therefore, Mr. Allred has not obtained full review of the trial proceedings 
based on the merits and has been deprived of an opportunity to receive effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate counsel neither 
can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, 
nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's 
decision to relinquish Mr. Allred's probation. Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Allred 
on the probable role the transcript may play in the appeal. 
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Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental 
briefing raiSing issues which arise as a result of that review. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Allred respectfully requests that this Court place him back on probation. 
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new 
probation violation disposition hearing. Alternatively, Mr. Allred asks this Court to 
further reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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